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Introduction
In our days the international division of labour has arrived at an entirely new 
phase, one called Allyn Young specialization, characterized by the penetration of 
multinational firms, long production chains, exchange of diverse fittings and com- 
ponent parts, and the fragmentation and disintegration of formerly complex indus­
trial processes (Kol-Rayment 1989). In contrast to the past decade, signs o f this 
process getting under way and gathering strengths have come to be clearly dis- 
cernible in Hungary as well (Novoszath 1993).
It is commonly known that competition between multinational firms within in­
dustrial branches has by now exceeded the confines of skirmishing in partial mar- 
kets, with globalization the dominant trend. The pattern of the world economy 
during the next decades will probably be determined most strongly by this process, 
that of the spread of m ultinational’ “cobweb”1. Therefore one of the greatest Prob­
lems in our times concerns Company response to this global challenge. For the 
time being, the relevant theories are not one mind, some arguing the unification 
of, some the emergence of deepening divergences in, structures as being the more 
probable trend. Nevertheless there is broad consensus about the impossibility of 
exploring these processes by methods currently known and widely employed.
The relevant theory has evolved in two main directions. According to the ad- 
vocates of the school of convergence, each multinational firm is under the influence 
of the business culture of its country of origin and can be observed to transmit its 
specific traits acquired in that country to its organizational units located abroad. 
In other words, differences in state regulations of the countries of origin may be 
preponderant factors in influencing the internal structure of Companies, their system 
of motivation and thereby their output performance in the socio-economic fabrics
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o f  different host countries. At the same time, shifts in and the natures o f  markets 
are feit by everyone and generate similar Company responses, which point in the 
direction o f  uniformity.
By contrast, the exponents o f  the school o f  divergence hold that the main ques- 
tion is that o f  how  the actors o f  the market assess the processes enfolding around 
them and how  they will respond to related challenges. In fact, the influence of the 
extemal environment reaches the inner world o f  firms through many transmissions 
and filters and, given as different the corporate cultures, responses to challenges 
may also vary by firm. Companies are influenced mostly by the immediate envi­
ronm ent in which they operate and, as the international activity o f  large Companies 
strengthens, i.e. their multinational and even transnational character becomes more 
marked, their policies and possibilities will be less and less determined by the 
socio-economic conditions prevailing in the countries o f  origin.
Both schools appear to agree in that any Company failing to give appropriate 
responses to the challenges facing it is going to share the fate of RCA or Dunlop, 
two one-time giants, both of which have disappeared, leaving behind nothing but 
their names as warning examples of passing glory.
Another important feature of our times is the changing pattern of multina­
tional production and marketing structures. Earlier, what the larger firms did 
was place part of their capacities on the markets of countries that they found 
worth conquering, but in fact they behaved like “colonizers”, compelling the 
hosts to adapt their own corporate culture. Frequent employment of foreign 
managers was a striking manifestation of this. Managers from countries of origin 
employed in missionary role came automatically into a relationship of superor- 
dination to local employees, and if they had no sense of vocation in studying 
the spirit of the host country, nobody complained about that. This state of af- 
fairs, however, soon to be ended by sharpening competition and a dramatic 
shortening of the lyfe-cycles of products and technologies. Our times dictate 
the need for the specific demands of different markets to be also taken into 
account in the course of planning and implementation, benefiting from the cost- 
saving effect of global production.
These developments come posing new challenges to managers of multinational 
firms and force present-day missionaries to “live in the Roman style if they are at 
Rome” . This process appears to be invigorated by a growing number of multina- 
tionals seeking to train would-be managers among the gifted young Titans of the 
host countries. Also, a body of experience gained at numerous multinational firms 
operating in Hungary shows it to be much easier to change a manufacturing tech- 
nique or to introduce a new marketing or perhaps book-keeping method than the 
mentality of people, established Orders of value, traditions and forms of behaviour 
(Poör 1992).
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1. Brief Overview of Attitudes to Foreign Capital
Among the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary 
proved to be the most attractive region for foreign capital up to the end o f 1992. 
Although in 1993 international capital showed a greater interest in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Russia, there were founded 17.529 joint ventures in Hungary 
by the first part of 1993.2 The number of newly established joint ventures and the 
pattern of direct international capital investments are indicated by the following 
figures:
Year Number of joint 
ventures
Value o f joint ventures 
rin US$^
1989 1879 550 million USD
1990 3814 900 million USD
1991 5642 1.700 million USD
1992 4010 1.641 million USD
1993 Ist half vear 2093 651 million USD
Source: Falubirö (1993)
The share of foreign capital investments in the original stock of Companies with 
foreign interests increased from 1991, Thus, for instance, this percentage share was 
40 in 1991 against 77.1 in the first part of 1993.
Comparative analyses usually divide foreign investments into 3 categories. One 
is green-field manufacturing capacity, in which case foreign investors Start from 
the base in building the firm’s system of relationships. This form is especially 
preferred by large firms, for it calls for sizable capital input, which medium- or 
small-sized firms are incapable of.
Establishment of joint ventures is the second form of undertaking with great 
traditions in other countries as well. The adoption of the Associations Act imparted 
impetus to the fonnation of associations in Hungary, with large amounts of capital 
contributed also by a considerable number of foreign Companies as partners of 
Hungarian firms.
Lastly, privatisation is the third form of investment, offering many opportunities 
for foreigners to bring their capital invested within the framework of transactions 
connected with privatisation amounted to 1.3 billion dollars at the end o f 1992, 
representing nearly 30% of foreign investments motivated by purchase of formerly 
state-owned property.
147
Csaba Mako  —  Peter Novoszdtli: Multinational Fiivis and H etemgeiwity o f  Labour Relations.
______________________________________________________________________ Tlw Hungarian Case_____________________________________________________________________
Most investment projects launched in Hungary with the participation of foreign 
Capital are made up of joint ventures, which have so far changed property structures 
for the most part and, to a lesser extent, economic (real) processes at the Company 
level, meaning that genuine “working” Capital appears when, following the change 
in ownership, productive capacities are also expanded in the form of increase in 
the original stock. (For instance, the purchase by the French firm Sanofi of 40% 
of the Chinoin shares did not modify except the property structure of the pharma- 
ceutical factory as a first step. Productive capacity expansion was facilitated by 
an increase of US$ 10 million in the original stock as a second step. A similar 
pattem was observed in connection with the purchase of Tungsram shares by Gen­
eral Electric (Falubirö 1993).
In evaluating the role of foreign Capital in Hungary and analyzing its impact on 
industrial relations it is practicable to distinguish two-step capital investment as 
mentioned before and green-field manufacturing capacity (the latter may be well 
exemplified by the Opel Car factory of General Motors at Szentgotthärd or the 
Hungarian Suzuki Car Factory established by the Japanese at Esztergom).
Before presenting industrial relations at multinational firms we shall give some 
idea of the trends in the attitude of the Hungarian population to foreign Capital. 
The findings of a nationwide representative survey conducted in the period 1992 
to March 1993 show a changing climate of public opinion about the appearance 
of foreign capital in Hungary (Lengyel-Linczowski 1993). In the spring of 1992, 
for instance, more than one-third of the interviewees agreed without reservation 
with foreign capital shares in Hungarian enterprises, whereas this ratio feil to less 
than one-fourth a year later (1993). Those favouring the appearance of foreign 
capital in the Hungarian economy are to be found mostly among educated people 
of younger age (secondary school and university graduates) and among inhabitants 
of Budapest. Those opposing the participation of foreign capital come from the 
lower age-groups (over 60), people with lower levels of schooling, and rural in­
habitants. Also, it is worth while to cover in more detail the changing pattem of 
approaches appreciative of and recognizing the advantages of firms operating with 
foreign capital (see Table on the next page).
A growing ratio of the Hungarian population believes that foreign capital invest- 
ments have favourable economic effects, mainly in the increasing volumes of in­
vestment, income and profit. Opinions are less favourable concerning their job-cre- 
ating role and clearly unfavourable concerning their impact on the country’s eco­
nomic development.
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Ouestion: What is the advatitage o f firms operciting with the pcirlicipation o f  
foreign capital?
Advantages 1992 1993
Attract more monev 14.9 40.8
Technoloeical develop 17.1 31.3
Economic prosperity 13.7 12.6
Increasinq market share 8.0 18.7
Improvintz work-moral 4.0 10.3
Job Creation 10.7 16.4
Hi eher Income 4.4 14.5
Higher Profit 2.5 16.4
Source: Lengyel —  Linczowski (1993).
2. Multinational Companies and Industrial 
Relations
2.1. Industrial Relations at the Company Level
Before outlining the pattems of industrial relations at multinational finns we 
shall describe the distinctive features of trade union involvement in the economic 
activity of firms in the early 1990s. Our findings are based on surveys conducted 
by the Japanese Research Institute of Industrial Relations in Hungary in the summer 
of 1992 and in the spring of 1993 (J.I.L. 1993).
The most important survey results indicate that whereas the relationship 
among a large number of trade union confederations emerging in the wake of 
the change in the political regime (1990) bore the marks of sharp political, ideo- 
logical and personal rivalry, the dominant element of relationships at the Com­
pany level was Cooperation between trade unions on the one hand and between 
employers and trade unions on the other. Given the typical economic structures, 
and under conditions of slump (recession), the prevailing pattern of Cooperation 
brings favourable influence to bear on the defence of workers’ interests as well 
as on Company chances of survival. (Company-level cooperation between trade
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unions and Companies has a long past to look back upon in Hungary and is 
inseparable from what is called workers’ characteristic tradition o f  “dual loyalty” 
(Makö 1987).
A representative Organisation of workers is active at the overwhelming ma- 
jority (85%) of Hungarian enterprises included in the national sample, the most 
influential of them being the National Association of the Hungarian Unions 
(NAHU), the renewed old trade union confederation. In more than one-fourth 
(446) of the Companies covered by the survey, management is willing to bargain 
with local trade unions, while only a fraction (9%) is ready to do so with the 
strongest organization of workers. The structural pattem of labour disputes at 
the Company level has undergone a notable change under the combined impact 
of privatisation and economic recession. Under conditions of social employment 
typical of socialism, labour disputes revolved mainly around wages and fringe 
benefits.
Labour Disputes
Subject-matter of dispute Before 1990 In 1990 and after
Reorganization of enterprise 96 117
Privatisation effected 30 114
Workers’ property ownership 
introduced
24 109
Job securitv 85 175
Wage issues 245 213
Fringe benefits 196 158
Plant labour regulations, ar- 
rangements for shift work
84 54
Working time (overtime) 84 64
Benefits on dismissal 39 122
Today, by contrast, privatisation and enterprise reorganization as well as related 
employment security and circumstances o f  dismissal due to redundancy (e.g. sev- 
erance pay) are focal points o f  dispute in bargaining between Company manage- 
ments and trade unions.
Trade unions continue to be ready for bargaining with Company managements. 
This cooperative attitude is manifested even in connection with problems like lay
ISO
Csaba Mako  —  P eter Novoszätli: Multinational Firnis and Heterogeneity o f  Labour Relations.
______________________________________________________________________The. Hungarian Case_____________________________________________________________________
off. For instance, lay off was rejected by as little as 20 of the trade unions affiliated 
to NAHU, was accepted by a vast majority (99%), and was even supported by a 
considerable number (64). O f the organizations affiliated to the Democratic Ligue 
of the Independent Unions, which was the first to be established and was regarded 
as having adopted a critical approach, only 1 rejected lay off, while the rest of 
trade unions active at the Companies included in the sample were acquiescent in 
or supportive of it.
2.2. Evolution of Industrial Relations 
at Multinational Firms
The appearance of multinational Companies in Hungary is judged very positively 
by public opinion in general (on this point see the results of public opinion poll 
mentioned above!). Specialists raise several questions and express anxiety about 
the presence of multinational firms. Anxieties are often founded, are partly based 
on incomplete information, and are ideologically tinted (with Claims that e.g., such 
firms undermine the national industry). The most frequently expressed anxieties 
relate to market purchase, displacement of Hungarian products from international 
markets, and a deterioration of Hungarian positions on the former CMEA markets. 
In order to give a complete picture we shall naturally refer to appraisals that expect 
the appearance of international firms to lead to new employment opportunities, 
technological development, modernization of the Service sector, and streamlined 
methods of management and direction in the form of additions to productive ca- 
pacities.
Apart from the positive or negative attitudes expressed in general terms, today 
we have a small body of ordered information about the activities of multinational 
firms in Hungary, their human resource policies, and industrial relations associated 
with them (OECD Seminar 1993).3
In this paper we attempt to describe those elements of social-organizational re­
lations between employers and workers that are determinative of the methods of 
manpower utilization. The joint ventures founded with the participation of foreign 
capital may be classed by several criteria, it being practicable to distinguish, for 
the purpose of examining industrial relations, joint ventures established in the form 
of green-field manufacturing capacity and through buyout of state-owned enter- 
prises already operating.
In the first case, the social-organizational relations o f  Companies have to be 
created almost from “ nothing” . The second case, the partners to industrial relations 
(company management and trade union alike) have to reckon with the previous
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pattems of interest and power relationships as well as with social and cultural 
traditions inseparable from them in the process of transformation accompanying 
the change in ownership.
We have chosen to present the Operation of Hungarian Suzuki Corp. in illustra- 
tion of the appearance and Operation of foreign capital in the form of green-field 
manufacturing capacity, and in outlining the role of foreign capital in a Hungarian 
enterprise formerly owned exclusively by the state we shall discuss a few features 
of industrial relations as they prevail at Aeroplex Ltd. established with the partici- 
pation of MALEV and Lockheed. (It is to be noted in parenthesis that data and 
other information about the operation of multinational firms are extremely scarce 
and are not in easy access to sociologists.)
2.3. Works Council Instead of Trade Union: 
the Example of Hungarian Suzuki
The volume of Japanese capital investments in the former socialist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe is virtually negligible. With this trend in view, it should 
be noted that almost one half of all investment projects were launched and over 
fourfifths of invested capital (USD 74.4 million) were laid out in Hungary. nearly 
one half of the latter amount was used for the establishment of Hungarian Suzuki 
Corp.
The founding document of the Corporation — formed with 51% of Japanese 
capital (40% for Suzuki Motor Co. and 11% for C. Itoh. with shares of 40% 
for Hungary and 9% for International Financial Corporation) — was signed in 
1990 after little short of 10 years of negotiations. The market considerations 
involved in establishing the Japanese-Hungarian car factory were these: (a) the 
average lifetime of cars in Hungary was 10 years in the early 1990s; (b) Hun­
garian owners would urgently replace about one-third of 3 million cars as they 
were over 10 years old and two-fifths of them had a high polluting 2-stroke 
engine; (c) the customs tariff levied on cars imported to Hungary was 35 5 
from 1990. The 5 door Swift cars with 1.000 cc and 1.300 cc motors and the 
4 door Sedan turned out by Hungarian Suzuki in Hungary form part of the 
firm’s world market strategy. Accordingly, the small cars (Maaiti with 800 cc) 
are manufactured in India, the larger Sedan of medium category in Hungary, 
and the off-road vehicle in Santana of Spain. Hungarian Suzuki Corp. plans to 
turn out 50.000 cars a year, but the firm’s capacity will allow this figure to 
be increased to 100.000. Supplier’s shares in the total volume of assembled cars 
are shown by the following table:
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Percentage shares
1992 1993 1994
Suzuki import from Japan 70% 60% 40%
Hungarian suppliers 30% 40% 60%
of which: Hungarian 
Suzuki Corp. (Esztergom') 20% 20% 20%
Other domestic suppliers 10% 20% 40%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Note: Gabor Bakos (1992): Japan and Central Europe: New Subregional forma- 
tion and Japans presence. Tokyo: The Institute of Economic Research —  Hitot- 
subashi University, p. 33.
The job-creating effect o f the investment project in the local labour market 
(where the unemployment rate is 20% against the national rate of 14.5 in 1993) 
is not negligible: after the full running period of production, the total workforce 
employed will be 1.000 at the central factory of Esztergom and an additional 17.000 
to 18.000 at the supplying firms. Until April 1993, 150 Hungarian workers received 
training in the Kosai factory of Suzuki Motor Co., and the majority of workers 
were trained in Hungary. On the part of Suzuki, 25 persons assist the Hungarian 
Company management and 25 are active in the direction of production.
Preference in recruitment was given to qualified young people (20 to 25 years 
of age). Applications were threefold at the Start, but this rate feil later. The Hun- 
garians receiving further training at the Suzuki plant in Japan were critical about 
Japanese working conditions (1.5 hours of overtime a day, meals), but only 15 
quit the Company. The Japanese Company management is very content with the 
Professional skills of Hungarian maintenance and repair workers and thinks that 
Hungarian workers are overskilled in general.
With regard to wages, the multinational firms in Hungary pursue two strategies: 
one follows actual wages prevailing in the labour market and reckons with rela- 
tively significant fluctuations thereof. The other offers 20 to 30% higher wages 
than those prevailing in local markets and seeks to win workforce loyalty (this 
stands closer to the wage-payment strategy of Hungarian Suzuki Corp.) Workers 
in production eam monthly wages of 25.000 to 27.000 forints, while the wages 
paid to managers directly in Charge of production and to foremen are 20% higher, 
and remuneration is combined with extra time and productivity bonuses. Perform­
ance is assessed twice a year in the case of workers, employees and managers 
alike.
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In the planning and organization of work the Japanese Company management is 
pressing the case for the application of methods characteristic of the Japanese 
practice of manpower utilization (job rotation, QC, etc.). In this connection the 
Japanese managers complain that the Hungarians are individualists and have a 
weak team spirit (Neumann 1993).
The institutions of and mechanisms for regulating industrial relations as well as 
the methods of human resources management are not yet established at Hungarian 
Suzuki Corp. Still, the Company management shows some discernible features of 
an anti trade union attitude. Trade union organization at the Company is at its 
incipient stage. Only a fraction (7%) of the current workforce is members of the 
Iron Worker’s Union, which initiated the formation of workers’ representative or­
ganization from the outside. The Company management is not particularly friendly 
to the trade union, which is well illustrated by, among others, the fact that it has 
not yet feit the want of a partner with which to conclude a collective agreement 
governing matters covered by the Labour Code (new Labour Code, Act XXII of
1992). It nevertheless feels the need for workers’ involvement in decision-making, 
because it is otherwise impossible to design a two-way Communications system, 
from top down and from below upward, to guarantee a smooth flow of production. 
This explains in fact the establishment of the Works Council at Hungarian Suzuki 
Corp. in October 1992, although the related elections took place in the country 
early in the summer of 1993.4 The 9-strong Works Council meets monthly to 
discuss in the first place questions like production plans, training, and increase in 
eamings. As was stated by Istvän Lepsenyi, General Manager of Hungarian Suzuki 
Corp., “the Works Council serves its purpose perfectly, as it intends to introduce 
the Japanese model o f paternalist employer in Esztergom as w ell” (Heimer 1993).
2.4. Series of Conflicts: the Case of Aeroplex 
of Central Europe Ltd.
2.4.1. Complications of Establishment
At present the number of multinational firms among a total of nearly 18.000 
joint ventures or entirely foreign-owned Companies may be estimated at several 
hundreds, yet the Hungarian trade unions declared but one strike in support of 
wage demands at a Company with foreign interests operating in Hungary, namely 
at Aeroplex Ltd., a joint venture of Hungarian Air Transport (MALEV) and Lock­
heed Aircraft International Service (LASI). This is to say that Hungarian workers 
and trade unions besieging Companies with foreign interests with “impossible”
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wage-demands is far from being a dominant feature of the Hungarian landscape. 
In what follows we will highlight the chief motives for, focal points of tension of, 
and antecedents to the only strike so far staged at Aeroplex Ltd.
The formation at Ferihegy Airport o f the joint venture by the American firm Lock­
heed and Malev were not also free from complications. It was in February 1991 that 
the MALEV management officially announced that a declaration of intent concerning 
the foundation of a joint venture for aircraft repair and maintenance Service had been 
signed with LASI. The basic function of the limited liability Company to be formed 
with a share of 50% contributed by each side to the original capital was defined as 
including maintenance of MALEV’s entire aircraft park and doing of job-works for 
other airlines. The joint venture was founded with the aim of modemizing aircraft 
maintenance through introduction of the American partner’s management and work­
ing methods and through assistance in obtaining qualifications and licenses pre- 
scribed by the aviation authorities of the advanced Western countries.
The MALEV workers concerned complained that the company’s general man- 
ager had included them in the bargain offer to the joint venture without informing 
them and obtaining their consent. They did so because they were of the view that 
MALEV would practically seil nothing but the skills and the labour-power of its 
workers (the latter being ridiculously cheap compared to the Western average) as 
a contribution of capital to the joint venture. Therefore they sought information 
about what other potential partners the MALEV management might have negotiated 
with, about what other considerations might have guided it in opting for the Ameri­
can firm, and, in general, about how that concept fitted into the scheme of 
MALEV’s privatisation as contemplated at the time.
MALEV’s one-time director-general initially conceived of the foundation o f the 
joint venture as constituting a partial privatisation of MALEV, but the trade unions 
concerned found out, on the basis of the opinion of Hungarian and foreign experts, 
that Lockheed-MALEV Ltd. could not be regarded at all as constituting a (partial) 
privatisation of MALEV in accordance with Hungarian legislation in force, but 
simply as establishment of a new economic association.
Furthermore, the experts invited called the attention of MALEV’s trade unions 
to the possibility that, with the intended Ltd. formed, MALEV’s entire technical 
sector and aircraft repair capacity would be withdrawn from the process of priva­
tisation. Should workers be transferred to the new Company before MALEV’s trans- 
formation into a Corporation, they might stand to lose several of their rights rec- 
ognized by law, namely they would have no say in the process of privatisation 
and no possibility of obtaining worker’s shares.5
Again the experts point out that Lockheed wanted to acquire an important market 
value and to gain regional economic and political advantages at a low price by a 
volume of investment far below the value of the planned activity.6 On the other
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hand, what “remained” of MALEV might be considerably devalued by its depend- 
ence on its own joint venture managed by Lockheed specialists.7 Its aircraft could 
not be repaired by others, and the inevitable costs of developing the repair base 
should also have to be shouldered by the new owners. The national airline Company 
and, for quite a long time to come, Hungary’s only international airport might also 
be mortgaged, for next to nothing at that.
The Lockheed case posed a serious decision making dilemma for MALEV’s trade 
unions, for workers did not in general question the need for and the raison d’etre of 
such a technical undertaking, and acting in that spirit, the trade unions considered it 
their prime duty to represent and defend workers’ interests consistently. Accordingly 
the trade unions sat down to the negotiatingtable with the MALEV management, but 
tried to uphold their rights from the outset. In several cases they lodged written Pro­
tests with the State Property Agency (SPA) and the Ministry of Transport, Commu­
nications and Water Management (MTCWM) conceming the Ltd.S
Acting under that pressure, an operative committee composed of representatives 
of SPA, MTCWM and MALEV took up the case on 21 January 1992. The workers’ 
delegates to the negotiations repeatedly stated the need to include their demands 
in a draft contract and their wish to learn the content of the final text in exercise 
of their lawful rights. Promises to that effect were made by the managements of 
SPA and MALEV at the meeting.
That being settled, MALEV’s workers leamed with astonishment and indignation 
that on 24 January MALEV’s general manager had signed, without their consent 
and any consultation with them, the contract for the foundation of the joint venture 
with the Lockheed representatives in Budapest.9 In a Statement of position signed 
unanimously on 5 February, MALEV’s trade union round table protested against 
that procedure and put on record that the workers’ side refused to assume any 
responsibility in connection with the foundation of the Ltd.
On 6 February, despite the protest, MALEV’s legal representative submitted to 
the registry court an application for the registration of the Ltd., which was actually 
registered, so Aeroplex of Central Europe Ltd. (ACE) came into being formally.
In response, the Independent Trade Union of Air Mechanics (ITUAM) requested, 
on 20 March, a review of the Ltd’s foundation and the suspension of its Operation 
on grounds of provable irregularities.
2.4.2. The spell of the past
With the disputes around its foundation settled, ACE officially started operations 
on 30 June 1992 with 840 workers and 6 American managers, but there remained 
numerous outstanding questions yet to be solved.
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In the last days of June 1992 the workers of MALEV’s Maintenance Division 
called personally on the head of MALEV’s human resource management centre to 
cancel the labour contract with ACE, because they thought they would no longer 
enjoy various benefits due to them as “MALEV men”. Thereupon, when Aeroplex 
was formed, all workers transferred from MALEV received a wage increase of 
21% under a one-year agreement. That was not, however, an effective increase, 
but a compensation for lost benefits formerly granted on a non-regular basis, and 
as an across-the-board measure, it failed to reduce existing disparities in wages to 
any degree.10
When the firm started operation, workers promised to demand no wage increase 
for a period of one year. Indeed, there was no increase, apart from one of 20% 
for the firms top managers. it appeared that the Situation with regard to workers 
returned to normal, with the previous tensions on the wane.
“Although we did not widerstand, we were unfortunately "made to widerstand", 
that ACE was the only sohition which would enstire jobs, higher wages, higher 
Professional appreciation, and a more secure future. And, protesting vigorously, 
we ßnally asked for our transfer voluntarily. Indeed, our then leader o f L1TUAM 
went under in the protest" (a navigation mechanics, ITUAM leader [Bercsenyi, 
1993/b]).
In June 1993, in connection with delays of 3 of its flights, MALEV informed 
the public saying that ACE was not adhering to maintenance and repair schedules 
and that the resultant delays of flights and the worsening Standard of services were 
causing damage to the airline. Yet, in the meantime, MALEV’s park of aircraft 
was expanding, old airplanes becoming obsolete, and flights increasing in number. 
These imposed mounting tasks on the now separate technical base, operating with 
staff of 150 workers less than before, reasoned the other side.
“With our staff strength reduced, we have to attend to aging aircraft, giving 
more work and presenting new difficult tasks we had not been prepared for  
(command o f English, international certißcates o f  qualißcation). We had a 
growing feeling that we were destined to be the scapegoat, and we were right, 
because ACE was said not to be perform ing the tasks it had undertaken. We 
were said to be doing bad work, which was causing problems o f schedule, de­
lays, longer time-lags in servicing, and changes o f aircraft. Yet we knew we 
had been coping with these same problems when we belonged to MALEV’s 
Technical Directorate, with the exception that then no one blazed them forth 
in public. Who is pointing to himself?” (an air mechanic, ITUAM leader 
[Bercsenyi 1993/b]).
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The term of the contract concluded with workers expired on 1 July 1993, and 
the trade union claimed that the conclusion of a collective agreement had been 
prevented by the management’s inadequate preparations. Therefore the renewed 
ITUAM active at ACE saw no point in wage bargaining either. On 15 July it 
announced its intention to Start wage bargaining independently of the question of 
collective agreement.
ITUAM maintained that nothing but a differentiated wage increase was accept- 
able, one that would be the first step toward a sensible reduction of the formerly 
established disparities in wages. In order to provide a basis for such a policy, a 
designated group of workers formulated criteria having regard for the international 
Standards applicable to the occupation of air mechanics. There was not much more 
to rely upon, however, since ACE had neither a description of jobs nor statues. In 
order for every worker to receive a wage increase according to criteria fully ac- 
ceptable for the management as well, it would have been necessary to raise the 
wage fund by 150% in 1993.
“The wage system fitl! o f stresses and strairn, with basic wage scales ranging 
from less than 20.000 to 60.000 forints in similar lines ofwork, was inheritedfrom 
MALEV”, said Tibor Hegedüs acting on behalf of ITUAM (Fahidi 1993).
According to him, the gross average wage amounted to 38.000 forints at Aero- 
plex, which is owned in equal shares by MALEV and LASI employs some 940 
workers, but the mechanics and technicians received only 32.000 forints on average, 
while over 200 specialists earned as little as 20.000 to 30.000 forints a month.
The argument of MALEV’s management that the monthly gross average earnings 
of 44.000 forints at ACE were twice the Hungarian average for industry did not dis- 
suade the trade union from enforcing its demand because it claimed that the type of 
work there was not average in any aspect (qualifications, skills, responsibility).
The demand for strike was clear evidence of a conflict of interests existing 
between the owners, i.e. MALEV and Aeroplex owned by the former in 50%. In 
common with Alitalia, MALEV set out on a revision of its relations with ACE 
and of the contract.
“It is not a fortunate solution for MALEV to order aircraft repair from an 
external Company, because doing so would bring it into a state o f dependency... The 
Company’s internal organs o f control had been entrusted before, namely inde­
pendently o f the present strike, with examining how the stipulations o f the contract 
between Aeroplex and MALEV were being carried out ”, said former Minister An- 
dräs Gälszecsy, Chairman of MALEV’s Board of Supervision (Magyar Hirlap
1993).
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Now MALEV came to strike a harsher note in wage bargaining with the “ex- 
temal” mechanics than it had with its own pilots a month before.11 According to 
the trade union, MALEV wanted to exploit the wage dispute and the strike for 
terminating its contract with the Ltd. Moreover, MALEV had invited mechanics 
from England and had said it would drop its wage offer altogether unless ITUAM 
backed off from its threat of strike.12 The strike was, as it was, inevitable under 
the circumstances consequential upon earlier and new conflicts.
“Everythhig (hat had gone cross with ns — wages, grievances about the reor- 
ganization a year before, the past year, an uncertain fitture, the alarming rate o f 
inflation and, what was among the most important prohlems, an almost complete 
lack o f information and continual disregard o f workers ’ opinion — boiled down 
to a single set o f concerns in those few  years" (an air mechanic, ITUAM leader 
[Bercsenyi 1993/b]).
“We came by slow degrees to see that the contract which had been concluded 
was quandary not only for ns, but also for one o f the owners, who is also a 
customer o f ours. Our hopes drove us to expect a better offer from the other owner 
because o f MALEV’s battening down the hatches, but Mr. Bram/ey let us know 
that he was unable to make a better offer” (a navigation mechanics, ITUAM leader 
[Bercsenyi 1993/b],
“In my opinion, the strike was a symptomatic consequence o f events over the 
past year or two. It conld well have been provoked much sooner by the tensions 
accumulated in the occupation o f air mechanics and in aviation in general. The 
past period gave evidence that the contract between the two Companies could not 
serve as a good basisfor cooperation. Added to alt this were a crisis o f conßdence 
and discontent, phenomena which were instrumental in the strike indicative o f the 
state o f affairs between MALEV and ACE” (a navigation mechanics, ITUAM leader 
[Bercsenyi 1993/b].13
Finally, after long quarrels, the strike ended with a compromise. The trade union 
accepted a wage increase of 34.6% as the last offer, which feil far short of its 
expectations, but, acquainted with the financial status and material conditions of 
MALEV Corp., Lockheed and Aeroplex, it realized that it was the maximum rate 
of increase that could be achieved. In addition, the ACE management and the 
ITUAM leadership committed themselves by a contract to doing their utmost to 
conclude a collective agreement by 15 October 1993. ITUAM undertook to raise 
no wage-demand during the period from the signing of the collective agreement 
to 31 December 1994.14
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The conflicts and wage bargaining between Aeroplex and ITUAM offered many 
lessons, the most important for us appearing to be that the disputes could have 
been headed off at the outset by paying due attention to the existing problems and 
undertaking timely and conscious efforts to mould the shape of industrial relations, 
the management-labour relationship, at the Company level.
“Negotiatiom should have been started earlier. I  myself have a share o f respon- 
sibility in that, but I  believe that conclusion o f the collective agreement is o f para- 
mount importance. In the future I shall be pushing ahead with the idea o f having 
these extremely important negotiations set in train sooner, about 60 days before 
the date o f expiration o f the agreement. We need much more accurate preliminary 
information to see the availability o f funds for purposes o f wage increase or other 
benefits. I fee l there is much for Aeroplex to improve upon in this respect” (opinion 
of ACE’s American managing director Bercsenyi 1993/b).
3. Some Conclusions
Foreign enterprises that Start operating by executing other than “green-field” 
investment projects undoubtedly find themselves in a Situation more unfavourable 
from the perspective of labour relations, because they have to devote considerable 
energy to streamlining “inherited” labour conditions as well as relationships, cus- 
toms and Orders of values established among the workforce in addition to carrying 
out eventual technical or technological development programmes. Moreover, ac- 
count should also be taken of any resistance which indigenous workers and even 
managements may put up to change in the social environment.
Nevertheless, even “green-field” investors may suffer hardships, as was evi- 
denced by the events of November 1992 at General Motors Factory in Szentgott- 
härd.15 In spite of such difficulties, however, our enterprises with foreign interests 
experience very few cases of tension between management and labour, and all 
wage-demands but one have been settled by way of peaceful bargaining, without 
recourse to strike.
Again, as is proved by the case of Aeroplex Ltd., grave antecedents set the stage 
for workers initiating a strike by risking their jobs and in part fighting for preserving 
them.
Of course, there is no doubt that integration of foreign enterprises, including 
multinational corporations, into Hungary’s socio-economic environment is not al- 
ways free from conflicts and that defence of workers’ interests in “decision-sharing” 
can hardly be to the liking of Western investors, who, after all, transfer their pro­
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duction to Central and Eastem Europe with cheap wages undeniably with the added 
aim of gaining advantage in prices. This is supported by the fact that the Hungarian 
Association of International Companies (HAIC) —  which organizes the interests 
of giant Companies such as Philips, Coca-Cola, Ford, General Electric-Tungsram, 
Suzuki, Henkel, Unilever and United Technologies —  deems it necessary to have 
some modifications introduced into a few paragraphs of the Labour Code relative 
to the rights of works councils (See Heimer 1993 and Kasriel 1993).
In addition to united action, however, the experience gained at multinational 
corporations in Hungary shows significant and substantial differences between Com­
panies in building labour relations. There are firms like Hungarian Suzuki Corp. 
that tries to meet worker’s demands halfway and urge the establishment of a works 
council before the time-limit set by law, while disliking the formation of a trade 
union. Also, there are some which do not find works councils to be desirable and 
lay primary emphasis on bargaining with the strongest trade union, while others 
do not think that either a works council or a trade union is really necessary and 
generally make no conscious efforts to build industrial relations at the Company.
1 According to a study prepared by IJNCTAD, the value o f  world trade was $ 4.(XX) million million in 
1992, whereas the multinational corporations in otlier tlian headqnarters states "produced” S 5.500 billion 
wortli o f  trade flows in goods and services. (These fignres do not include the value o f  services supplied 
by bank empires abroad). In the light o f  figures it is not surprising that in tlte past year o f  recession the 
multinational corporations acted as the inotor o f the world economy (G.Gy. 1993).
2 In illustration of the vast scale o f change it will be noted that in Hungary there were as little as 282 joint 
ventures operating with a capital stock o f some 310 million dollars at the end o f 1988 (Vigväri 1993).
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3 To our knowledge, autliors discuss (liis subject in relevant literature only in connection with joint ventures 
(e.g. Viszt— Vänyai— Berkö [1990], Koncz [1992], Orolin [1992]).
4 The rights o f the works council are regulated by the new Labour Code as follows:
1. The distribution and utilization o f the welfare fimd as well as the labour salety regulations are
subject to joint decision by tlie enterprise management and the works council.
2. The enterprise management must obtain the views o f the works council on
a. measures affecting larger groups o f workers (e.g. reorganizations, transfonnations, transfor- 
mation o f organizational units into independent organizations, privatisation);
b. establislunent o f a system o f  personnel flies;
c. plans for workers’ training access to employment promotion subsidies, and early retirement
policies;
d. measures for the rehabilitation o f workers with reduced working capacity;
e. annual schedule o f leaves;
f. introduction o f new methods o f organization o f work and o f performance requirements;
g. draft internal regulations atTecting worker’ important interests;
li. competitions organized by the employer and involving material or moral recognition.
3. The enterprise management must inform the works council on
a. fundamental questions conceming the employer’s economic Situation, at least once in every 
6 month;
b. major draft decisions conceming significant adjustments in the employer’s scope o f activity 
or relative to the employer’s investment projects;
c. pattems o f  wages and eamings, liquidity relative to wage-payment, characteristics o f  em­
ployment, utilization o f working time, and characteristics o f working conditions.
5 Government Decree No. 119/1991 (IX .12.) guarantees, inter alia, that no privatisation may be effected 
without worker’s knowledge o f and say in it. No unfounded property assessments may be made, and 
workers may have a say in social benefits as well. Furthermore, the property policy guidelines enable 
workers to buy business shares or shares in an association on easy terms.
6 This is supported by the fact that Lockheed requested 4 million dollars to be sent to Himgary for 6 
American managers for a term o f  5 years, against a contribution of as little as 2 million dollars in cash, 
whereas the total assets o f the Ltd. will not reacli the 6 million dollar mark, although MALEV’s technical 
Service was valued four or five times tliat amount even by the Consulting firm Credit Swiss First Boston, 
which gave a rather low estimate o f MALEV’s property.
7 In fact, with a share o f 50 % Lockheed obtained a voting majoritv without a majority share in property 
by sending its managerial staff to Budapest and placing them in key positions.
8 Tliis explains in part why Lajos Csepi, Managing Director o f SPA, wrote a letter to the MALEV man­
agement on 16 December 1991, conununicating that since the foundation of tlie Ltd. greatly affected 
workers’ economic and social interests, and given the company’s weight, it constituted a significant step 
in the process o f MALEV’s privatisation and was therefore subject to tlie provisions o f  Govenunent 
Decree No. 119/1991.
9 A s is known, MALEV announced the fact o f signature at a press conference on 3 February, tlie General 
Manager o f MALEV stating that tlie dispute with workers’ representative organizations had been settled 
prior to the signing o f  the contract and that the parties had come to an agreement satisfactoiy to workers.
10 For that matter, ITUAM Claims that tlie technical personnel were promised a wage increases as early as 
the autmnn o f 1991, when tlie MALEV management recognized tlie legitimacy o f tlie mechanics’ demand 
for a pay rise. Since no such measure had been taken despite the agreement, tlie trade union brouglit the 
matter to the labour court. It won the case, the decision ordered MALEV to bargain about wages, but the 
mechanics had by then been transferred to the new joint venture, so tlie decision was clearly inapplicable 
to this employer. Tlie only result was that none o f tlie technical personners 7 trade union representatives 
continued working with Aeroplex. This notwithstanding, ITUAM has 580 members today against 170 in 
December.
11 On 11 June 1993 tlie MALEV pilots went 011 a strike of waniing for nearly 2 hours in support o f their 
wage-demands. Tlieir ahn was to approximate the wage levcls o f different groups of MALEV workers to 
tlie international average. I11 many aspects, this strike was an added organic antecedent to tliat o f air 
mechanics. It is characteristic that according to tlie opinion o f the Chainiian o f MALEV’s Board of
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Supervision, for instance, the trade union o f air mechanics should liave joined with the pilots in their 
demand for a wage increase, thus making it clear that Üiey would stop work unless they were granted at 
least as lügh an increase. However, they had originally demanded an increase o f little less than 100 %, 
so had no chance o f  winning the sympathy o f MALEV workers, particularly the llying personnel, for the 
latter had even seen their income decrease because o f the strike (L.K. 1993).
12 The deployment o f 18 British air mechanics provoked a strong wave o f protest. The International Transport 
Worker’s Federation (ITWF) protested with MALEV and Qualitair, which had sent the mechanics, against 
tlie (planned) strike breaking and called on its affiliated organizations to voice similar protests. NAHU  
strongly condemned the preparations for breaking the strike and considered that the conflicts generated 
by unilateral non-compliance with tlie previous agreements were a source o f  profound concem. Tlie In- 
tellectual Union’s Bloc voiced indignation about MALEV’s intention to use strike breakers against tlie 
Aeroplex workers rising lawful demands, and this from a country that has a rieh tradition oftrade imionism. 
Cooperativ Fonun o f  Unions also pledged solidarity witli the air mechanics on strike. Tlie National Council 
of the Worker's Council niade a similar Statement, adding that it would join inteniational actions o f  
solidarity unless the employers changed tlieir metliods.
13 On the day the air mechanics went on strike Craig Bramley, Deputy Head o f Lockheed’s Personnel 
Department, arrived in Budapest, held talks with tlie trade union representatives tliat aftenioon and tlie 
following moniing met tlie MALEV's managers, vvho would only have been inclined to agree to a pay 
rise in excess o f their previous ofler if  tlie extra costs tliereof had been defrayed in full by Lockheed as 
co-owner.
14 We shall provide a summation o f all tlie conditions laid down in the Agreement signed by Aeroplex o f  
Central Europe Ltd. (thereinafter referred to as employer) and tlie Independent Trade Union o f  Air Me­
chanics representing the fonner’s workers (thereinafter referred to as ITUAM/ACE):
1. The Agreement signed by the Parties shall remain in force for 18 months, tlüs period to start 
numing on 1 July 1993 and to expire 011 31 December 1994 at 20 hours.
2. The rate o f  wage increase shall be 34 .6 % relative to the basic wage fund o f the workers concemed 
in June 1993. The wage increase shall be retroactive to 1 July 1993 and its amount shall be 
distributed according to the principles o f tlie new “GALI IAM” scale o f  values jointly adopted (by 
ITUAM and Aeroplex).
3. ITUAM/ACE imdertakes to raise 110 new wage-demand from the date o f  signature o f  this Agree­
ment to 31 December 1994.
4. A representative o f  the company’s workers, who is also on the Board o f  Supervision, shall attend 
all official membership meetings. His presence at otlier 11011-0 fllcial conferences o f  owners shall 
be subject to invitation.
5. Tlie employer undertakes to inforni ITUAM/ACE o f any contract signed by the Company as well 
as o f  any amendments and additions tliereto affecting workers’ economic interests. The person 
representing workers 011 tlie Board o f  Supervision shall have the right to inspect such contracts. 
This Agreement shall not derogate from the management’s right to decide freely 011 matters af- 
fecting the Company.
6. Since the employer is not in a posilion to influence all factors that may necessitate dismissals, 
tlie Agreement stipulates that Aeroplex shall try to avoid any dismissal o f a larger scale during 
tlie tenn of tlie Agreement. Any layolT shall be executed in accordance with tlie Collective Agree­
ment to be concluded. Botli Parties (ITUAM and Aeroplex) shall make every effort to conclude 
tlie Collective Agreement before 15 October 1993.
7. The employer imdertakes not to use the package o f wage increase as agreed upon herein for 
covering the wage costs o f workers to be engaged after 1 July 1993.
8. The employer shall continue to train an adequate number o f workers in such skills and types o f  
aircrafl as may be required to meet tlie needs o f MALEV and otlier customers. Aeroplex shall 
continue to draw, in tlie manner detennined by the nianager, 011 existing funds secured by contracts 
relative to tlie joint venture.
9. Aeroplex has rcaffirmed LASl's intention to provide ad hoc technical assistance for Aeroplex at 
tlie request o f its nianaging director, such assistance to be govemed by the stipulations o f  tlie 
contract relative to the joint venture.
10. The management o f Aeroplex undertakes to secure ordere for services to be supplied for additional
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third parties. Depending on the success o f  efforts to secure such Orders, it is Aeroplex’s intention 
to examine tlie possibility o f  designing a profit-sharing systein to be applied in future.
11. Botli Parties undertake to Start wage bargaining for 1995 on 1 November 1994.
12. The Parties declare that they consider the wage bargaining started on 11 Anglist 1993 as concluded 
and that after the signing o f  tlie present Agreement they will not raise any demands against the 
other Party concerning the results o f negotiations.
13. Tlie present Agreement shall be complementary to tlie Collective Agreement to be concluded by
15 October 1993. Any violation thereof or non-compliance therewilh shall entail tlie legal conse- 
quences detennined by the Labour Code.
14. Tlie Parties signing this Agreement 011 behalf o f the employer and workers are duly authorized 
thereto.
15. The Hungarian and English texts o f this Agreement shall be signed simultaneously, the Hungarian 
text to be regarded as official.
In November 1992, 200 out o f  tlie 500 workers of tlie General Motors factory at Szentgotthard formed a 
group, thereby shocking the Company management. Tlie Works Council w'as elected 011 29 March 1993, 
and it lent support to tlie wage demands o f tlie trade union established in autiunn last year and declared 
its readiness to exercise its rights to obtain infomiation from tlie company’s managers. (For more detail, 
see Kasriel [1993] and Heimer [1993]).
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